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I INTRODUCTION 
Upon introducing the Death with Dignity Bill to Parliament MP Peter 
Brown stated: 1 
l believe that everybody who has led a decent, law-abiding life is entitled, 
when their time has come, to die with dignity- to die in the comfort of their 
friends and family , and not to die a suffering, lingering death. 
It was based upon this belief that he introduced the Bill, assuming that it 
was a necessary piece of law refonn to enable euthanasia to be lawfully carried 
out. This essay will consider whether this assumption that law refonn is 
necessary to achieve this aim is correct, and whether legislation in the nature of 
the Death with Dignity Bill is the best way to achieve this law reform. 
In order to consider this question it must be asked whether the courts are 
already dealing adequately with this issue. Many cases that are essentially 
euthanasia cases have come before our, and other common law, courts. The 
charges brought are often less than murder, and sentences given are generally very 
lenient, considering that the cases involved the death of a person . ln light of this, 
it would appear that the restrictions on euthanasia in our Jaw are not particularly 
harsh or st,ringent, and maybe legislation is not needed. This discussion occurs in 
the first part of this paper. It sets out the current law in ew Zealand in relation to 
what are essentially situations of euthanasia. This is explored further in relation to 
examples from case law, examining how the courts have dealt with these 
situations. The problems with this cuJTent law are then discussed , with the aim of 
considering whether change to law, in the fom1 of legislation, is required . 
Given the problems identified with the law as it is presently operating the 
second part of this paper looks to the best way to deal with the legalising of 
euthanasia, and whether the Death with Dignity Bill is a good \\ay to achieve this . 
An exarnination of the Bill as to what it atternpl to irnplernent is carried out. This 
1 (30 .Jui ) 2003) 610 NZPD. 
3 
is followed by a brief discussion of whether the Bill is an effective way of solving 
these problems identified . 
. . . . . ~ This paper 1s not concerned with the morality of euthanasia .-
A The Terminology 
Euthanasia is a strongly emotive topic. It is essential that any debate is 
carried out using widely accepted definitions, to ensure that the arguments are 
presented, and received, in a helpful way. The manipulation of the differing 
conceptions of euthanasia presents a real problem in working towards a reasoned 
and informed debate. Some basic definitions have become accepted in 
widespread writings on the topic of euthanasia. 3 Euthanasia generally is regarded 
to be the killing of a person because it is believed to be in their best interests.4 
Distinctions are drawn between voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia, as well as between passive and active euthanasia. 5 Most debate on 
euthanasia 1s only concerned with voluntary, and limited non-voluntary, 
euthanasia, and legislation (proposed or enacted) internationally has reOected that . 
This is also the scope of the Death with Dignity Bill. 
2 For discussion of the moral issue good sources 'are John Keown (ed) E11tlw11a.1·w Exa111i11ed 
(Cambridge Uni versi ty Press, Cambridge, 1995); Margaret Otlowski /'o/untarr Euthanasia and 
1/,e Co111111011 law (Clarendon. Oxford, l 997); A Nell' Zealand J'vledica/ 1/ssocwtio11 Repor! of 
Euthanasia avai lab le from the ZMA. 
' For further discussion of these definitions see the NZMA report; Otlowski; 1cola Lacey and 
Ce li a We lls Rec()111·1ruct111g Cm11111al law (Bunerworths, London I 99, ) 481 
~ This immediately excludes from the debate issues that arise 111 the arguments opposmg 
euthanasia with regards to the policies in Nazi Germany. While these cases were ca ll ed 
eu thanasia, they were not carried ou t in the best interests of the patients and so were no more than 
murder. 
'Voluntary eu thanasia is where euthanasia is requested , and carried out as a result of that request 
on-vo luntary euthanas ia 1s \\'here the patient 1s 111capac1tated to a degree where they arc not ab le 
to request, or consent to, euthanasia. In voluntary euthanasia is where euthanasia is practised on a 
patien t against their express\\ i,hes, or 1\ here lhcy \\'CIC ablc lo g1\'c co11se11 t. but 11 1\as not 
cnq ui1 ed \\ hethc1 thcy J1d co1hcnt. Passi\c cuthanas1a 1s thc \\ ithd1a\\Jl 01 \\1thhold111g or Ille-
susta ining treatment. In contrast to thi s. active euthanas ia 1s the when an act1\C measure . like the 
aclministrat1on ora drug. 1~ takcn to bnng about a patient's death. 
4 
JJ THE CURRENT PROIIIBITJONS ON EUTHANASIA 
Cun-ently, according to the Crimes Act 1961, euthanasia is illegal by 
virtue of provisions against murder, aiding and abetting suicide, and failure to 
provide the necessaries of Ii fe by those under a statutory duty. 
Section 167 sets out the primary provision in relation to murder. It holds 
that if the offender intends to cause the death of the victim, or if the offender 
intends to cause the victim bodily injury and is reckless as to whether death 
ensues, they will be guilty of murder. 
Aiding and abetting suicide is made illegal by virtue of section 179 of the 
Act. It provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of 14 years for anyone 
who helps any person commit suicide. 
Some people, including: 6 
[ e ]very one who has charge of any other person unable, by reason of detention, 
age, sickness, insanity, or any other cause, to withdraw himself from such 
charge, and unab le to provide himself with the necessaries of Ii fe , 
are under a duty to provide another with the necessaries of life. Any 
omission to perfonn that duty results in criminal responsibility. This liability for 
omissions clearly applies to doctors. 
Another section of the Crimes Act applicable when discussing cases of 
euthanasia is section 164. This section provides that any person that by any act or 
omission hastens the death of someone suffering from some other disorder or 
disease, is legally responsible for killing that person. 
Finally an important point with regards to euthanasia is that section 63 
provides that "[n]o one has a ri ght to consent to the inOiction of death upon 
himsel r'. 
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III THE CURRENT LA 1V JN ACTION 
By examining the way the courts have dealt with euthanasia cases it is 
possible to assess whether this piece of legislation is necessary law reform. Few 
cases that come before common law courts are openly admitted to be euthanasia 
cases. However, this section examines cases, which are on their facts cases of 
euthanasia, explores how the court dealt with the issue, and whether this removes 
the need for legislation making euthanasia legal. These cases can be broadly 
grouped into four categories, cases of assisted suicide, compassionate killing of a 
loved one, so-called "passive" euthanasia cases, and cases of necessity. 
A Assisted Suicide Cases 
The first category of euthanasia cases that has faced determination in 
common law courts are those of assisted suicide. These cases can be classed as 
euthanasia because they are about people, who are suffering from some form of 
illness or injury, and who request help because they want to die but lack the 
ability to kill themselves. A classic example of this scenario is the case of R v 
Ruscoe. 7 
WaITen Ruscoe was charged with aiding and abetting suicide after he 
helped his best friend Gregory Nesbit kill himself. 8 esbit suffered an accident 
on a building site in England that the pair was working on. He was rendered 
tetraplegic, with no hope of recovery. He often talked of killing himself, but 
given his lack of ability, starving himself was the only possible means. To avoid 
this the pair came up with a plan that involved the help of Ruscoe. Ruscoe placed 
about 50 pills in Nesbit's mouth and provided him with water, enabling him to 
swallow them. They then drank some whiskey together, reminiscing. Once 
esbit was asleep, Ruscoe placed a pillow over his face, to ensure death . 
6 Crime,, Act 1961 , s 15 1. 
7 R 1· Ru.1we l1992] 8 CR.NZ 68 (C,\) Cool-- c I' 101 the Cu UJt. 
~ The fa ct that he was not charged \\ ith murder 111 it. c l r sugges ts somcthmg ahout the di sc retion 
hcing exercised hy prosecutors 111 cases or thi s nature 
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1 Hoiv the courts dealt with the case 
Ruscoe was convicted of aiding and abetting suicide, which carnes a 
maximum sentence of 14 years ' imprisonment. He was sentenced to nine months 
in prison. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal held that there was no requirement to 
impose imprisonment for charge of aiding and abetting suicide "nor indeed even 
for mercy killing". 9 He was therefore sentenced to one year's supervision and 
counselling and/or treatment as directed by probation officer. They regarded the 
cases that would not require a custodial sentence to be "very exceptional". 10 
The court based this decision on Ruscoe's compassionate motives and the 
problems he faced in his life, as a result of Nesbit's death. 11 Nesbit's family's 
support of Ruscoe was also mentioned. They considered the trial judge's ruling 
that he was under a duty "to demonstrate to you and to others who may be 
similarly minded that society by its law does not tolerate it and cannot excuse 
such behaviour". 12 They went on to deny that such a duty, based on the sanctity 
of Ii fe and deterrence, exists. 
2 Issues raised by thisjudgment 
The obvious problem with this result is that it provides no denunciation or 
general deterrence, factors which are generally given substantial weight in 
sentencing decisions. Ruscoe broke the law. He assisted in his ftiend ' s suicide, 
something that the law usually treats very seriously. However the treatment of his 
case by the Court of Appeal would suggest that in these circumstances assisting 
suicide is an acceptable thing to do. This leaves in doubt in what circumstances 
the crime of assisting suicide should go unpunished, which creates unce11ainty as 
to the application of the law and presents a difficulty for people in a similar 
9 R ,. Ruscoe, above, 72. 
111 /? ,. R11 1coe. above. 71. 
11 fh e 1111p li ca t1 011 be ing that the dep ress ion and ,tl cohol ab use probleim th,1t Ruscoe ,,as suffe1ing 
r1olll c1 1"tc: 1 thCSC: C: Xpcnt; I1 CC:S, ste lllll ll llg 1"1 0111 the: pdlll ol" hcJp111g h1 ~ bc:sl l'IIC:llll d ie: IIC: le 
puni shment enough and that impos ing a sentence of 1111pn sonment wo uld se rve no purpose . 
I' R ,. R111coe. above, 7 1. 
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situation trying to predict their liability. Therefore, although the courts dealt 
effectively with this euthanasia case it has created the problem of uncertainty in 
the application of the law prohibiting assisting suicide. 
There is also a difficulty reconciling the judge's reasoning with the general 
rule that motive plays no part in criminal liability. It would seem obvious that the 
fact that Ruscoe was attempting to help his friend out of an unhappy situation, and 
acted through feelings of love and compassion was taken into account by the 
judge when making his sentencing decisions. 
B Compassionate Killing Cases 
The second class of euthanasia cases that have come before our courts are 
the compassionate killing cases. In these cases the 'victim' is a relative or loved 
one of the person charged, and they are killed because the killer believes it is what 
they would have wanted. The element that distinguishes these cases from the 
assisted suicide cases is that the 'victims' are not able to express the desire to die 
themselves, due to incapacity. 
A recent example of this class was the case of Rex Law, who killed his 
Alzheimer-suffering wife in 2002. The Laws had made a pact years earlier, 
agreeing that if either were to get Alzheimer's the other would 'do them in'. Mr 
Law gave his wife a quantity of sleeping pills, hit her over the head with a mallet, 
and held a pillow over her face. He then attempted to take his own life. The next 
morning he reported what he had done to the Police. He was found guilty of 
murder, but under the provisions of the Sentencing Act 2002 was given a sentence 
less than life. being sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. 13 
The sentence imposed was given with regard to the purposes of 
sentencing. Randerson J focussed on denunciation of the acts done and deterrence 
for the wider community on as being the relevant and pertinent aims or sentencing 
" /? , . L t /\1 ' [ 2002 J 19 CRN!'. 500 ( I IC) Randersnn J 
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for the facts of the case. 1-1 Randerson J's concern in sentencing came strongly 
from a point of view of condemning the act of euthanasia (not that he called it 
such) of Aliheimer's sufferers for the benefit of the public, not from any particular 
desire to punish Law or hold him to account, acknowledging that the loss of his 
wife was punishment greater than the court could impose and that he had taken 
responsibility for his actions. 
The mitigating factors Randerson J identified included Mr Law's age and 
state of health, the compassionate and trying circumstances surrounding the case, 
Mr Law's guilty plea, his acceptance of responsibility, his evident remorse, and 
his previous good character. 15 
By the imposition of this sentence for a conviction for murder, the courts 
appear to be saying that while Law did not really need to be punished a sentence 
of imprisonment was required to illustrate the wrongfulness of killing another 
person. The problem with this is that Mr Law was sentenced to 18 months in 
prison to serve as an example for other people. The imprisonment was not 
designed to be a personal punishment. This would imply that there was nothing 
wrong with Law acting as he did, in those particular circumstances. 
C The Withholdi11g Treatment Cases 
The cases of so-called "passive euthanasia" or the withholding treatment 
cases usually apply in relation to doctors . These cases are ones where the 
deceased had some form of life-threatening illness or injury but was being kept 
alive by the medical profession . The act of withholding treatmen t, like a life-
support or ventilation machine, effectively brings about the death of the patient, 
however this is rarely prosecuted . ln this way, "pass ive euthanasia" is part of our 
law. A problem in the way this operates now however, is that decisions to 
cuthanise patients arc generall y carried out in line with what is medically best for 
14 This is espec1::illy interest111g 111 the light or sentencing decision 111 RwcoL', both Judges seemed to 
feel s11rnlarly about the olknde1 ·s culpa btl 1t y, ye t\\ htl e Cooke P ignored denunc1at1on and ge nernl 
deterrence to allow Ruscoe to escape 1mpnsonmcnt, Randerson J felt that 1t \\·as precisely because 
of these foctor~ that he had to sc·ntencc I .J\\ to a ,entc·nce of 1lllpri ,011lllent 
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the patient, rather than based on any indi cation of what the patient might want, as 
would be more consistent with a true idea of euthanasia. 
A very useful judicial discussion of thi s practice occurred in !111ck!a11d 
Area 1/ea /tl, Board \' Attome_1•-Ge11 ero /. 1 <' This judgment of Thomas .I was a 
declaratory judgment sought by the hospital and doctors treating Mr L. Mr L 
suffered from Guillain-Bane syndrome. This disease shuts down the body's 
nerves, rendering the sufferer completely paralysed, however, their brain remains 
functioning . Although the heart and lungs stop functioning the patient's brain 
stem is still active, meaning that medically the patient is still alive. Life support 
and ventilation systems are set up to keep the brain supported. 
The doctors treating Mr L wanted to withdraw the ventilation system 
maintaining his brain. There was no chance of Mr L improving and once the 
treatment was withdrawn death would be painless and instantaneous. His doctors 
sought, and received, eight specialist medical opinions that the treatment was not 
medically justified. Mr L's wife also agreed with the withdrawal of treatment. 
1 How the courts dealt with th e case 
Thomas J gave a declaration stating that if th e doctors withdrew the 
treatment they would not be found guilty of culpable homicide. This 
detennination required that they conclude that there was no reasonable possibility 
of Mr L recovering, there was no medical or therapeutic benefit to continuing 
treatment, withdrawing life support constituted good medical practice, and Mrs L 
and the ethics committee of Auckland Arca Hea lth Board agreed. 
He based this decision on two maJor points : the duty to provide the 
necessaries of life, and the question of lawful excuse. He also discussed the 
question of whether the doctor , by removing the life support sy tcms, would be 
causing Mr L's death, or whether his death would be caused by the underlying 
" R ,. /.a11 ·, abm c. 509-10. 
Jc,. lucl,la11d lrrn //c:11/1!, Board, . 1l11om t'\ _(;t'lll'ml [ 1993 J I '\I.LR 235 ( 11 ( ' ) I homas J. 
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condition, Guillain-BatTe syndrome. He stated that if it was held that the life 
support did not constitute a necessary of life, or if it did but the doctors had lawful 
excuse in refraining from providing this necessary, they would be held to have not 
caused Mr L's death. 
Thomas J ultimately concluded that the life support system was not a 
necessary of Ii fe, and therefore the doctors treating Mr L were not under a duty to 
provide that system. He stated that "the provision of artificial respiration may be 
regarded as a necessary of life where it is required to prevent, cure or alleviate a 
disease that endangers the health or life of the patient". 17 He went on to say that 
in this case, as Mr L was only alive because the system was inducing his heartbeat 
and breathing, and was otherwise beyond recovery, the ventilator could not be 
understood to be a necessary of life. This conception of a life support system as a 
necessary of life only if it maintains the body while there is a chance of the body 
recovering to regain this ability itself is very effective at drawing the line of when 
doctors are under an obligation to provide the artificial treatments that are 
available to patients. 
This distinction is also helpful when considering ideas of acts or 
omissions, with regards to whether a doctor does a positive act, thereby causing a 
patient's death, or whether a doctor omits to provide treatment, thereby letting the 
underlying disease cause a patient's death. This case effectively classifies 
preservation of life for no therapeutic or medical purpose as death being deferred. 
[n this way the treatment is only holding off what would naturally happen, and 
therefore an omission to provide this treatment results in death caused by the 
disease. 
Despite finding that the doctors were not required to provide the life 
support Thomas J held that, in any case, the doctors would not be acting without 
lawful excuse. I le based this on th dcci ion that they have a lawful excuse when 
"there is no medical justification for continuing that fom1 of medical assistance". 18 
17 A11ck/011d Area 1/eal!I, Board, . Allo1·11e ,·-Ce11 cml, ahO\ c. 2..i9 . 
1
' . l11c l,lo11d , /rea lle11/!l1 /Joan/ 1 , lll<Jl"ll l~\ -(ieneml. abm e. 250. 
11 
Discontinuation is lawful if it accords with "good medical practice". Thomas J 
acknowledged the difficulty of coming up with an acceptable definition of the 
concept of good medical practice so stated that it will depend on the 
circumstances of each case and the medical opinions prevailing at the timc. 19 
The core concept that comes from this analysis is that acting within "good 
medical practice" could at no time be acting "without law ful excuse". 20 While 
this provides a very useful tool for deciding when doctors ' actions that border on 
euthanasia are excused by the law it leaves open the question of whether doctors 
are required to do those actions in similar cases. The case does not answer the 
question raised by this scenario of whether had these doctors decided , against 
good medical judgement, to keep Mr L alive, his family would have been able to 
prosecute (perhaps on a charge of assault), based on the idea that they were acting 
without lawful excuse. 
Thus, by holding that the life support system was not a necessary of life, 
due to the fact that it was not merely sustaining Mr L's body while he suffered 
from a condition that stood a good chance of improvement; and that by acting in 
accordance with good medical practice the doctors were not acting without lawful 
excuse, Thomas J held that the doctors would not be prosecuted for culpable 
homicide if they removed Mr L from the life support mechani sm. He further 
discussed the impact of this on the question of causation by saying, 21 
it can only be sa id that the withdrawal of the ventil atory system is not the 
cause of death as a matter of law 1f and when one or other of the two primary 
condit1ons have been met, that is, the doctor 1s not under a duty to pro\ 1de the 
ventilator as part of the necessaries of li fe or has a lawful excuse for dec lining 
to do ~o 
On the basis of thi s case it would appear that cw Zea land law allows 
passive euthanasia in the fom1 of withdrm,\ al of treatment where the cond ition the 
patient is suffering l'rom is not going to improve, and where it is good medical 
1
'' ,. / 11cl,/1111rl .-1 n ·a I lt'alil, LJoarrl ,. A 11ome1 -( ,eneml, aboH:. 2)0. 
~
0 .- l11ck/1111rl lrrn llt'11/1!, Board, . , /11om t:1·-Cc•11c·ml. abmc, 2) I 
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practice (a determination of which is helped by other specialist oprrnons, the 
consent of an ethics committee and the consent of the patient's family) . 
2 Issues raised hy thisjudg111e11t 
In this way the courts were able to effectively deal with this type of fact 
scenario. Through the doctors acting as they did Mr L was provided with relief 
and those treating him avoided criminal sanctions. However, the situation Mr L 
was in is very restrictive . It raises questions as to what would have happened had 
Mr L not been reliant on a ventilator to survive; would the doctors have been 
allowed to administer a lethal injection? It would also be a stretch to apply this 
analysis to tem1inally ill patients . Attempt could be made to argue that doctors 
would not be acting without lawful excuse if they were to provide lethal quantities 
of a drug to a tenninally ill patient, based on there being no medical justification 
for keeping that patient alive. However, as the administration of the drugs would 
not be classed as neglecting to provide the necessaries of life, the argument that 
the doctors were not acting without lawful excuse would not provide re li ef. 
Therefore, although the court's decision adequately protects those in the 
same situation as the doctors treating Mr L, this decision is not like ly to provide 
relief on a wider scale. Another difficulty with this approach is that for a time the 
doctors treating these patients would have to bring applications to the cour1, as 
was done in thi s case, until enough of a body of cases was bui It up to enab le them 
to accurately predict the ir liability. This would of course entail the requisite costs, 
and the time involved could be crucial for the patients. 
A more fundamental iss ue raised by this scenario is that of consent. This 
decision raises the possibility that doctors, provided that the treatment is found to 
be not a necessa ry of life and that there is no med ical justification for continuing 
treatment, could remove treatment from a pati ent regardless of \\ hcthcr they 
consented or without consi deration of whether they would have consented had 
they had th e ability. In 1/ucklwul 1/rea 1/eo/r!, Board Mr L 's \\if'e ,,ds in 
~
1 1/11ck/011d •l l"t'o l/co/1!, 8oonl ,. /11om c1·-Gc11em l . abo,·c. 2~-l . 
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agreement with the withdrawal of treatment, and while the judge commented on 
this it is unclear how necessary this fact was to the final decision . 
In these ways the current law, while dealing adequately with this spcci fie 
fact situation, is insufficient to provide relief to the greater number of patients for 
whom relief would not just be a matter of removing treatment. It would therefore 
seem that although legislative reform may not be necessary to allow the 
withholding treatment cases analogous to this one, it is necessary for wider 
application. 
D Necessity Cases 
The fourth class of euthanasia case at common law are those involving 
questions of necessity. Most of the discussion involving necessity as a defence to 
euthanasia has come out of Canada, especially following the Latimer case. 22 The 
idea behind this class is that when someone is faced with treating a dying patient 
the weight of the circumstances should be taken into account in detem1ining 
whether this should entail a defence to murder. ln this way rather than legalising 
euthanasia it would be a means of fitting it under the structure of a defence 
already in existence. 
It is commonly held that the defence of necessity does not apply to 
murder. 23 This is because one of the requirements of the defence is that the hann 
imposed cannot be greater than the harm sought to be avoided . This would mean 
that killing someone would never be a lesser harm than not gaining the benefit of 
your actions would be. However, it is not difficult to imagine situations where 
someone might say, "Death would be better than this". There arc some instances 
where the ham1 caused to a person by keeping them alive is greater than the harm 
that killing them would cause. Opponents of this could argue that the harm to 
society is greater in carrying out euthanas ia than letting them die without 
22 R ,, L(//i111er [200 1] I SC R 3 (SCC) Judg n1L·n1 oft hL' Ctn11t. 
21 l·or a di sc uss ion u r the de , c lop1m:n1 or the Id \\ 1cldt1 ng tu the defe nce o r ll CCCSs ll ), sec 131 ookc 
LJ ·s judgmenl in /11 r e , I (Children ) (Co 11 jo111('( / T ll ·1111 S111g1rnl Sepurot/011 ) [200 I] h.1111 I cl 7 
(CA). 
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intervention. However, ignoring the plight of these sufferers for society's "moral 
good" raises questions about the cost of upholding this morality, and indeed 
whether such treatment of society's dying would in itself have a profoundly 
negat ive impact on soc iety's "moral good". 
A compelling example when looking at the necessity cases is that of Dr 
ancy Morrison , a doctor from ova Scotia, Canada. Her case involved the death 
of the patient Paul Mills, who was dying of cancer. Following several operations, 
one removing his oesophagus, Mr Mills was struggling with infection and other 
effects of the operations. The doctors treating him came to the decision that 
nothing more could be clone for him, and it was agreed with his family that the 
dying process should be allowed. Mr Mills was extubated (the tube carrying air 
clown his throat was removed) at 12:30 on 6 November 1996. Until 2:30 Mr Mills 
gasped for air, apparently in great distress and pain, despite the very large 
quantities of Dilauclicl, Ativan and some morphine that were being administered to 
him through an IV line. Just before 3 pm Dr MoITison administered Mr Mills 
with a syringe of nitroglycerine, in an attempt to lower his blood pressure and 
reduce his distress. Then at around 3 pm she gave Mr Mills, via [V-push, lOcc 's 
of potassium chloride, which has the effect of stopping a patient 's heart. 
Potassium chloride has no pain relieving purpose, and generally its only use in 
medicine is to stop a patient 's heart durin g open-heart surgery. Within seconds of 
Dr Morrison administering this via IV-push , Mr Mills' hea rt stopped and he died . 
J How the courts dealt with the case 
At the preliminary hearing of Dr Morrison 's case for murder2-1 (although 
the Crown suggested that the actual charge would be manslaughter), Crown 
witness Dr Barker gave ev idence that the amount of painkilling drugs being given 
to Mr Mills was within the lethal range and th at it was ex treme ly unusual and 
extraordinary that they were not having an effect on relieving Mr Mills' distress. 
He raised the poss ibility that the IV line had become dislodged from Mr Mills' 
\Cin, with the resu lt that the drugs were merel y go111g i11to his bouy cm ity. 
' -I R 1· ,\/orn1011 (27 h.:bruar; i99t' ) l'\o,·a Sco11a l'nJ1111c1al ( 'ou11 7201~~ Randall Pm, J. 
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The preliminary inquiry judge, Judge Randall, held that there was not 
sufficient evidence that would allow a properly instructed jury to convict Dr 
Morrison, and therefore discharged the case. He based this on the question of 
causation . The defence argued that as it appeared that the massive doses of 
painkillers being administered to Mr Mills were not reaching his bloodstream, the 
IV line must have been detached, meaning that the potassium chloride was also 
not reaching Mr Mills' bloodstream, and therefore there were significant 
questions as to whether this actually caused his death. Presumably this is the 
argument upon which Judge Randall dismissed the case. Upon appeal to the ova 
Scotia Supreme Court Hamilton J held that while this conclusion was wrong, it 
was entirely within the judge's jurisdiction and therefore could not be 
overturned. 25 
2 Issues raised by thisjudgment 
The problem with this case is that the preliminary inquiry judge ultimately 
made a mistake. He distorted the test that he was required to apply in detennining 
whether the case should go to trial thus allowing the case to be dismissed, 
presumably out of sympathy for Dr Morrison and a belief that she should not face 
charges because of her actions. Judge Randall undertook a weighing of the 
evidence and decided that she should not face charges, however, the fact remains 
that Mr Mills died within a minute of the potassium chloride being administered; 
a drug that was designed to stop his heart and, prima facie , had that very effect. 
While the dislodged IV causation argument perhaps held some merit, there were 
other theories as well. 26 
The case is also interesting in that when Judge Randall threw out the 
possibility of a murder charge, he also excluded from trial all lesser charges, 
including manslaughter and attempted murder. The attempted murder charge is 
especiall y interesting, given that even had the potassium chloride not caused Mr 
,, R ,, 1\l(//n.10 11 [ l 9lJ8J l'JSJ ,,l4 l (1 SSC) I lamil1011 J 
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Mills' death, Dr MotTison still injected him with it, presumably with the intent of 
killing him, as there was no other reason why potassium chloride would be 
administered to a patient in this situation.27 
ft has been argued that this case would have been covered by the defence 
of necessity, had it gone to trial. 28 Accepting a necessity d_efence in this case 
would have been a dramatic step for the courts, given that it is not regarded to be a 
defence for murder, however the argument would have run as follows. 
The decision had been made that Mr Mills was going to die. Massive 
doses of painkillers were being administered to him in an attempt to relieve his 
distress and ensure that he died in no pain and as peacefully as possible, 
unconscious if need be. These painkillers were not having the expected effect and 
Mr Mills was dying in agony. The nurse responsible for treating him, Elizabeth 
Bland-Maclnnis, gave evidence that his was the worst death she had ever 
experienced in her professional career. By injecting the potassium chloride Dr 
Morrison was making a conscious decision to administer a substance that was 
going to kill Mr Mills. In this way she was attempting to bring about the 
inevitable in a way that was faster and less distressing for all involved. This is 
obviously a case where one could argue that she was acting under necessity. 
The three requirements of necessity (set out in Perka , the defence 
explained by Dickson J as that those actions which arc "normatively involuntary" 
should not be punished) are that the accused faced a situation of imminent peril, 
there was no legal reasonable alternative, and that the hann caused was not 
disproportionate to the ham1 sought to be avoided .29 In thi case Dr Morri son 
certainly faced a situation of imminent peril. She was confronted with a patient 
dying a horrible death. As the doctor on duty in charge of treating Mr Mill s it was 
2c' 13arney Sne1derman und Ra) mond Deutsc her " l)r l\ ancy i\ lornson and her dying patient : a c.ise 
of medica l neccss it v" (2002) 10 ll ea lth U I. 
10 It has been on an attL" 111pted murder charge that other doctors,, ho ha,e admm1 stered KCI lo 
dy 111 g patient~ ha, e been p1 u~eulled. See the d1 ~cu~~1o n or N I C ·().\ 111 Sm:1de1111dn, abL>, 1... 18 Snc iderman. 
2
" R ,. Per/.:.a [ I <J~ -1 J 2 S( "R 232 ( S( "C ) Dickson J. 
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her responsibility to ensure that he did not have to suffer unnecessarily and to do 
her utmost to remove his distress.30 
Given the circum lances it was obvious that merely increasing the 
volumes of painkillers being given to Mr Mills was not a viable altemative. 31 The 
question remains as to whether Dr Morrison should have checked whether Mr 
Mills' intravenous line had come loose from his vein. Tn Perka Dickson J said, on 
the question of reasonable alternatives, "the question to be asked is whether the 
agent had any real choice: could he have done otherwise?". 32 On this basis it is 
possible to suggest that the test is a subjective one; Dr Morrison could not be 
expected to check anything that she did not think would be a problem . In any 
case further evidence relating to the common practice of doctors regarding 
dislodged IV lines would be necessary before deciding whether she should have 
thought to check the line. There is also the argument that presumably if the line 
was dislodged the potassium chloride, which was administered by IV-push, would 
not have had such a rapid effect had the line not been leading to a blood vessel. 
This suggests that checking the line was not a reasonable alternative. 
The question of proportionality generally provides a stumbling block to 
the application of the defence of necessity to serious crimes, and indeed has 
always prevented its application to cases of murder. However, in thi s case the 
different options facing Dr Morrison with regard to the death of Mr Mills are a lot 
more compelling. By administering the potassium chloride the ham1 caused 
(assuming that it was the cause of death) was the immediate death of Mr Mills. 
The harm avoided was Mr Mills further suffering to a long, drawn-out, distressing 
and painful death. In both cases death was unavo idable; the only variable was the 
30 l lowever, the problem \\ ith thi s 1s that genera ll y 1t would be understood that thi s dut y onl y 
extends up the point of" those thmgs that can be done for a patient short of ndmmistcnng a lethal 
injection. 
; 1.Al so 0 i\·cn that the \ Olumcs bc111~ ad111i11 1stcrcd \\Crc aln.:;:id) 111 the lethal 1an~c 1t 1s so me\\ hat ,~ ~ ~ 
ironi c that had ~he 111crea~ed the \U lume and he had di ed a\ c11esult ~he \\U uld nut ha\e been 
charged with hi s murder 
_;
2 R ,. Pi.!r/..11 , abm e. para -l I . 
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suffering of Mr Mills . In these circumstances it is easy to imagine a court holding 
that the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm sought to be avoided.33 
Thus, although the discretion of the trial judge operated in this case to 
avo id placing Dr Morrison on trial , it is a poss ibility (albeit a tentative one) that 
had the case gone to trial the defence of necessity would have been extended to 
cover this case. 
IV SO, WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE THIS? 
It can be argued, based on the examples above, the law is working 
adequately to exercise the requisite leniency and ensure that those who commit 
crimes that are essentially euthanasia are not receiving excessive sentences. In the 
light of this the obvious question is, why is the argument being made that law 
reform is necessary? It is because it will achieve four main things : greater 
accountability, less uncertainty, prevention of further damage to the credibility of 
the legal system, and the reduction of the strain the law as it currently operates 
places on those involved. 
A Accountability 
Euthanasia 1s often performed by friends and relatives, often with a 
pecuniary interest 111 the estate, or by a doctor acting individually. A major 
benefit of legislative reforn1 would be that the prac tice of euthanasia would be 
brought into greater scrutiny. As Sorell has said , " it is important for people to be 
able to justify to themse lves and to other people what they are prepared to do" .3.i 
Decisions would have to be made by the guide lines la id out in the Bill , and greater 
accountability would ensure that the dec isions being made truly were in the best 
interests of the patients. It would also provide greater sa feguards to ensure that 
,:; A court , i r they \\ ere looking to avoid the applicat1on or nccess 1l) to murder, cou ld put the harm 
ca used in terms of't he damal!.e caused to society by hold1n !.( that doctors had the abi lity to 
::idministcr a lethal injection in some si tu::it1ons. I lo\\e\L'I a mo1c rcal1\t1c, and certa 111l y more 
compassionate, \lay of looking at 11 \\OUld u1cly be tu Lu111..1..ptuc1li:.c the ha1m 1n tetms of the 
individuals invoh·ed. 
'• ·1 om Sorell Mom/ rt1e11rr 0111/ Cu111111/ Pu11is'1111c111 Hlacl,.1\cll I 9X7. p 2. in L accy p 525. 
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those requesting euthanasia were not doing so as a result of depression or a mental 
illness. 35 
This need for openness and accountability is especially relevant with 
Alzheimer's when the concern is that when relative caregivers kill their charge it 
is to remove them of the burden of caring for someone who treats them badly and 
no longer recognises them. By bringing situations like this into a controlled, 
legislatively enacted, method it can only improve rational decision-making and 
accountability. 
B Certainty 
At this time anyone who cames out euthanasia then has to take their 
chances with the run of the justice system. A lot rests on the exercise of 
discretion by the prosecutors, judges and juries. Legislative law reform would 
clearly lay out what is acceptable and what is not, with systems in place by which 
euthanasia would be procured. Breaches of the procedural safeguards would be 
the cause of an offence, with penalties laid out in the legislation. 
The major benefit of this certainty would be that the same requirements 
would apply to comparable patients regardless of the illness they are suffering 
from, and regardless of the treatment required to euthanise them. 
C Credibility of the justice system 
A major problem with the law as it stands is that the courts are continually 
manipulating and stretching the bounds of the criminal law in order to allow 
greater leniency for defendants in euthanasia cases. This was especially apparent 
in Morrison where the preliminary trial judge clearly acted outside the bounds of 
his duty, and in so acting allowed Dr Morrison to a\'Oid trial. 
" This imposes a stri cter sta ndard on those requesting assist,rnce u1Hk1 the 111'1 than those\\ ho are 
cJpable uf'co1lll111tting suicide thcrnschcs, \\ho arc dt l,I\\ .1llu \\<.:d to du ~u 1cgdldless of any 
mental illness. l lowe\·er. the policy concerns ofa lcg1slati\ e regime that \\Oulcl a ll o\\ mentall y ill 
to I ecc 1\ e euthanasia, rather than rece1v1ng assistance\\ 1th the 11 rnenta I hea lth issues, are ob\ 1ous. 
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With legislative reform, further stretching between criminal theory and 
practice will no longer be necessary. The existing offences and defences will 
retain their present shape as they continue to do what they were drafted to do, 
without the danger of the courts inadvertently making legal more than they 
intended. To prevent this damage to the justice system through the case law it is 
better that the legislature provides the boundaries, and the express borders of 
euthanasia. 
Also given that a large degree of discretion on the part of prosecutors, 
judges and juries is required to achieve the results that the justice system has been 
accomplishing, it is by no means likely that people carrying out euthanasia are 
receiving equal treatment by the system.36 
D Strain on actors involved 
A legislatively-established system would also reduce the level of strain 
situations like these place on those who feel compelled to help their loved ones. It 
would establish mechanisms, carried out by trained and supported professionals, 
to avoid placing friends or family in the difficult situation of having to break the 
law and risk punishment to help. Although Warren Ruscoe did not receive any 
time in prison, he was still left with a criminal record, and struggling to deal with 
what had happened. By bringing the process out into the open it enables all 
involved to deal with it Jess covertly and places Jess strain on friends and family. 
There is also the factor that their lack of knov,ledge of how to best achieve 
results, or difficulties with access to effective drugs leads to euthanasia being 
carried out in a less than ideal manner. This is especially noticeable in the case of 
Olga Law. Under a legislative system of euthanasia she would have been killed in 
a non-violent , painless, peaceful and well-planned manner by a qua Ii fied person, 
without the extreme level of stress that thi s situation placed on her husband. 
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Another concern with the law as it presently stands is that these people 
who are acting out of compassion often have to carry the label of murderer, and 
many are spending time in jail. Doctors who help th eir pati ents in this way face 
losing their licence. Idea ll y a new system would give th ese people an option by 
which they can act in accordance with their conscience and compassion for the 
'victim' and yet avoid criminal sanctions and labels. 
V WHAT THE DEATH WITH DIGNITY BILL PROVIDES 
So, if it accepted that legislative law refonn is necessary, the next step 
must be to examine the Death with Dignity Bill towards the end of determining 
whether it is an effective tool for solving the problems in the current law. 
The Death with Dignity Bill was first introduced to Parliament, and 
rejected, in 1995. Peter Brown MP reintroduced it in 2003. ft failed to pass its 
first reading by 60 votes to 57. In essence the Bill would allow for physician-
implemented euthanasia for tem1inally and/or incurably ill people who request it. 
The inclusion of relief for incurably (and not just te1111inally) ill people and the 
provisions to allow for advance directives as consent to euthanasia set the Bill 
apart from many other examples of euthanasia legi slation th at have at various 
times been touted , or passed, around the world. The Bill requires consent from 
the patient on the basis of full knowledge of the disease, its effects, the treatment 
to be given and its result. It requires a detem1ination by two physicians, with 
input from a psychi at rist and a counsellor. 
Clause 9 sets out th e requirements of the practitioner that the req uest is 
made to. S/he would be responsible for initiall y detem1ining whether the patient 
has a tenninal or incurable illness, detennining whether the request was made 
vo luntaril y, informing the patient of their diagnosis, prognosis, ri sks of the 
medication , th e probable result of the medica tion and feasible alternatives, 
''' As discussed abO\C, thi s 1s \Cry 110t1ccablc 111 a comparison of N111coe \\ llh /,1111 ' . I he s1: nte11cc 
they 1:nch recei\'Cd \\as dependent 011 the 1ud~e ewrcis ing hi s di. crc t1011. and resulted 111 l\\O 
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refen-ing the patient to a consulting medical practitioner, a psychiatrist and a 
counsellor, requesting that the patient notify next-of-kin, infom1ing the patient of 
their right to rescind the request, verifying before the final step that the request is 
voluntary and infonned, and ensuring that the Act is followed. 
The consulting medical practitioner would be required to confinn the 
diagnosis and prognosis and that the patient is suffering from a tem1inal or 
incurable illness, verify the request is voluntary, and advise the patient of 
alternatives. If the consulting medical practitioner disagreed with any of the 
findings made by the attending medical practitioner the request is void . 
The Bill would also require that the patient be referred to a psychiatrist, 
who would conduct an assessment of the patient's mental state. If the patient was 
found to be suffering from a mental disorder, or clinical depression that would 
impair judgement the request is void. A counsellor must discuss the request and 
its implications with the patient. 
A maJor prov1s1on 111 the Bill, and one that 1s unusual in proposed 
euthanasia legislation, is that providing for the ability to be euthanised on the 
basis of an advance directive. There are several operational, and ideological, 
problems with this provision; however it is a solution to problems that arise from 
someone's incompetence or inability to communicate their wishes. 
Schedule 2 of the Bill provides the template for an advance directive. It 
enables someone to request for themselves euthanasia in the event of them being 
rendered mentally incompetent as a result of four different conditions. lt sets out 
that the requester, if they should develop "senile, severe, degenerative brain 
disease", "serious brain damage", " advanced tem1inal malignant disease that 
renders any intelligible or understandable communication with others void", or 
"severely incapacitating and progressive degenerative di sease of the nerves or 
muscles", and that they have become mentall y incompetent to express their 
d11Tere111 outco mes for comp~ra blc o ffende rs. 
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op1n1on about their condition, and that two independent doctors regard their 
condition to be itTeversible, will be euthanised. 
VI WILL THE DEA TH WITH DIGNITY BILL FIX TI/E PROBLEMS'! 
In order to examine how the Bill would apply in practice this section 
returns to the examples used above to enable a detem1ination on whether it 
improves the situation of the law as it stands. 
A Gregory Nesbit 
If the Death with Dignity Bill had been in force esbit could have 
requested that his doctor end his life, on the basis that he was suffering from an 
incurable illness and experiencing pain, suffering and distress to an extent 
unacceptable to himself. This fact situation outlines the benefit of incurable 
illness being included in the Bill, rather than just the tenninal illness requirement 
that is common in many jurisdictions. 
There may be some question as to whether paralysis comes under the 
definition of incurably ill. The Bill sets out that incurably ill means "a medical 
condition which is generally accepted by the medical profession as seriously 
impairing the person's quality of life and unlikely to be capable of cure, either at 
the present time or in the reasonable future". Nesbit's tetraplegia was seriously 
impairing his quality of life, and no cure is available now or likely in the 
reasonable future. On this basis it can safely be assumed that the Bill will cover 
cases of paralysis. 
As many paralysed people suffer from some form of depression, the 
requirement that by requesting assistance under the Bill he would have been 
nssessed by a psychiatri st would have been a good thin g. This would have 
ensured that esbit's requests to die were not clue to a mental illness, which 
hopel\1ll y could be treated through less c, tremc measures. 
VICTO 
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B Olga Law 
To obtain relief under the Death with Dignity Bill, Olga Law would had to 
have signed an advance directive, prior to her developing Al zheimer's . r f she did 
not have an advance directive there would not be any legal option for Mr Law and 
if he was not prepared to let the disease take its natural effect he would have faced 
exactly the same situation. Tf he followed the same course it would be up to the 
courts to decide how they would deal with this situation, however, it is possible to 
conceive that the courts would take a much less lenient stance on euthanasia if 
there was a legal route of achieving the same objectives. However, the presence 
of a law would not change the moral righteousness of what Mr Law did, and the 
court, by setting out the reasons for prescribing the penalty it did implied that Mr 
Law was acting in a morally unobjectionable manner. The argument could be 
raised that he should not face greater punishment just because of the presence of 
an Act. Although, the courts may find that the general deterrence factor is of even 
greater effect by using this case to highlight to the public that it is only within the 
confines of the law that euthanasia may be practised. 
This scenano also raises another point about the medical method of 
euthanasia that the Bill provides for. Many objections to euthanasia come from 
the point of view that doctors, who primarily are responsible for saving lives 
should not be involved in procuring the death of a patient. 37 Either clue to this 
belief, or through a desire for a loved one to administer their death it is not 
unimaginable that someone who wanted euthanasia might want it to be carried out 
by a family member. This raises further questions about the extent for euthanasia 
outside of the mechanism provided for in the Bill , should it become enacted. 
This is where a large measure of the ' wait-and-see ' approach becomes 
necessary. Until cases of euthanasia that were not carried out within the 
frame\vork of any reforming leg is lati o n came before the cou11s it would not he 
possible to predict how lenientl y the courts would view an y cases of this nature. 
'
7 \'l a rga rc t Otl O\\ Ski l 'o /1111111n · E11r!ta11 111 111 w11/ rit e C'ommon Lai i· (C la rendo n. O xford . 1997 ): ,. / 
Nei , /.ealw 11/ 1\let!1cul ,, 11 1ocwr1011 !frpon (II 1:·111!ta11u11a a\ a ilablc rrom th e '\/.:-VI,\ 
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However, given that a great benefit of having cases of this type brought inside a 
euthanasia law is that there would be greater accountability in the actions of those 
assisting people who request help to die, it would seem incongruous if the courts 
were to allow the practice to continue to occur outside the safeguards provided by 
legislation. 
C Mrl 
Under the Death with Dignity Bill Mr L would either had to have made his 
request at a stage earlier than this application was filed in the courts, or have 
written an advance directive. If Mr L had completed an advance directive the 
situation he was in at the time the application to the court was filed would have 
been sufficient to activate the directive due to part (d) of the Schedule 2 forn1: 
"severely incapacitating and progressive degenerative disease of the nerves or 
muscles". His doctors and family would have no difficulty in fulfilling the rest of 
the requirements in the Bill and Mr L would be eligible for euthanasia. 
If Mr L did not have an advance directive to obtain relief under the Bill he 
would had to have made a request for euthanasia at the stage where he could still 
communicate. The difficulty with this is that in making the request the patient 
needs not only to be suffering from a tern1inal or incurable illness, which Mr L 
was, but needs to be "experiencing pain, suffering, or distress to an extent 
unacceptable to the patient". If Mr L made a request at a stage when he could still 
communicate it is conceivable that any suffering or distress he was experiencing 
was a result of the anticipation of what he would be going through in the future. It 
seems unlikely that this would be held to fulfil the conditions under the Bill. 
However, in reality this request would take the fom1 of an advance directive, the 
only concern being that he would then have to undergo a degree of distress as his 
nerves gradually shut clown and he lost the ability to communicate. 
Providing that the couris ignored thi s obstacle Mr L should have been able 
to obtain relief unucr the Bill . l lo\,e\ er, thi s is an unallractive solution. Gi\ en 
the delicacy or the subject matter or thi s Rill id eall y it \\'Ould result in euthanasia 
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being carried out strictly within the guidelines set out by the Bill . It would be a 
disagreeable situation to require the courts to adopt an approach that required 
them to examine the intent behind the words, rather than allowing everyone the 
security or what being allowed set out strictly in the Bill. 
Of course there remains the possibility that should euthanasia legislation 
be passed, and there is a difficulty fitting cases of this nature into that legislative 
structure, the courts continue to classify these situations as something other than 
euthanasia, and continue to apply the law as set out in this case. 
D Paul Mills 
Mr Mills' situation 1s similar to that faced by Mr L in Auckland Area 
Health Board, in that he would either had to have signed an advance directive, or 
have requested assistance prior to the time when Dr Mo1Tison was required to act, 
as he was not mentally competent at that stage. Had Mr Mills signed an advance 
directive he would have been eligible for help, as he was suffering from an 
"advanced terminal malignant disease", rendering "any intelligible or 
understandable communication with others void". If he did not have an advance 
directive he would had to have requested assistance to die at a stage when he 
could still communicate. Once again, like Mr L, the question is raised as to 
whether the "pain, suffering, or distress to an extent unacceptable to the patient" 
that led to him making the request is more attributable to his knowledge of future 
distress. However, given that he had cancer, had undergone several operations, 
and had major inrections in his abdomen, it is likely that at the time when he 
could still communicate he was already in large amounts of pain. Therefore, it 
appears that the Death with Dignity Bill would cover s ituations such as Mr Mills' 
effectively. 
E !111 i111prol'e111e11t? 
!'he kgislati\C rdorn1 vvould cc1tai11l y cn~urc g1catcr accountability in 
s ituations or euthanasia. By providing for a medical model for the leg,lli sa tion or 
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euthanasia it ensures that the system must operate in a transparent manner. 
Safeguards would be in place to prevent abuse. It is also considerably safer in 
terms of the categories of people who could be euthanisecl given that medical 
personnel are involved with regard to every step of the process, including the 
mental and emotional state of the patient. 
The law rcfom1 would provide greater certainty to some degree. A 
measure of certainty would be provide by virtue of the fact that a reading of the 
legislation would enable the actors to discover whether their conduct would be 
legal or not. However, some uncertainty would still exist in that it is unclear to 
what degree euthanasia carried out outside the bounds of the legislation would 
still escape the harshest penalties by virtue of an application of the earlier law. 
Law reform would prevent further damage to the credibility of the justice 
system. The clanger of reading the current law in ways that allow the practise of 
euthanasia yet could conceivably alter the criminal law to encompass unintended 
exceptions would be avoided. Legislation would enable the courts to work in 
accordance with clearly set out law, preventing the distortion of existing law and 
ensuring even-handedness throughout the decisions. 
Possibly the greatest benefit of legislation of euthanasia however, would 
be in removing the strain it currently places on those involved. By instituting the 
practice in a medical way it removes the need for individuals to take the sole 
responsibility for making these decisions. Training and support would be 
provided to those who are responsible for carrying out the procedure, thereby 
making it less stressful for both themselves and those who arc being cuthani eel. 
But perhaps the biggest effect will be that those who act with compassion in 
carrying out this procedure will no longer need to fear the consequences that the 
criminal justice system may impose. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
While on first glance it might appear that our courts are dealing with cases 
of euthanasia in a fair and just manner, a deeper analysis of the problems behind 
these decisions revea ls a need for more substantive law refonn. Given the 
uncertainty, the lack of accountability, the danger of distortion of our criminal 
justice system, and the extreme level of stress the current system places on those 
involved, legislative refonn is necessary. 
The Death with Dignity Bill is not wholly without issues. Anyone who is 
already suffering from illness or injury that renders them incompetent to make 
decisions or unable to communicate their decisions at the time the Bill comes into 
force will have to take their chances with the run of the justice system, a justice 
system that the passing of the Bill would make even more unpredictable. The 
same applies to anyone who chooses to seek euthanasia outside the medical 
parameters provided for in the Bill. 
However, it does go a long way towards reducing the problems that are 
currently embroiling this area of the law. It is understood that the Bill is currently 
undergoing revision, prior to being resubmitted into the ballot. Therefore, it 
remains to be seen what form this legis lation will be in when it next comes before 
our parliament. 
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